Economic historians, inspired by Douglass North and his broad reassessment of new institutional economics, tend to believe that the quality of the institutional framework of a nation or region has direct bearing on its economic performance. As explained in the introduction, the core assumption of this approach is that effi cient institutions ('rules that constrain behaviour') reduce transaction costs and thus increase market exchange, specialization, and therefore economic growth. Th e way to test such a hypothesis would be to develop methods for measuring the effi ciency of institutions, and link such measurements to observable economic performance. Much of the work in this fi eld has, however, focused on the supposed effi ciency of certain specifi c institutions, such as merchant and craft guilds, systems of property rights and tenure (how effi cient is sharecropping?), or on the effi ciency of the commons and their abolition via enclosures. Typically, new contributions to this literature have suggested that institutions that were previously considered 'conservative' and 'ineffi cient' -such as guilds and commons, manors, or sharecropping -were surprisingly effi cient, if the functioning of these institutions were examined more closely. Guilds, for example, took care of the effi cient transfer of knowledge and technology between generations (and between regions via wandering journeymen), stabilized labour and product markets, guaranteed the quality of products (necessary for domestic consumption and export), and were an effi cient source of taxation for (local) government (Epstein, 1998). Some have argued that this sounds too good to be true, and that revisionism ignores the 'dark side' of institutions such as the guildsnamely, that they excluded outsiders (e.g. women), monopolized markets, and tried to suppress innovation (Ogilvie, 2007).
